Clueless Putin does not know Ukraine or the Siloviki
Clueless Colonel Putin is in his own Freudian loop, whereby he created new members of NATO – Finland and Sweden - whilst setting out to limit NATO expansion.
Siloviki are the men of force, namely the Captains, Majors and Colonels who maintain the machinery of war and cruel repression of Soviet citizens. Private conversations and social media reveal growing dissatisfaction. The Ukrainian war is not going well and the Siloviki believe nothing will improve. Putin has no plan to exit the war. Ukraine represents 3.5% of the land mass of Russia, yet, Russia is floundering. Katsapy, a derogatory term for Russian soldiers, rape, torture and murder Ukrainian civilians. 10,000 crimes against Ukrainian civilians are being investigated by the International Criminal Court.
The Ukrainian army are preparing counter-strike operations: Case Study March 1944, against poorly led Russian troops. Ukrainian long range 155mm artillery are forcing short range 152mm artillery way from Kharkhiv and other cities. Russian food, ammunition and fuel convoys are being interdicted by drones and Light Anti-tank Weapons Systems (LAWS). The Russian army is being degraded with 460 tanks lost in action, 2,000 armoured vehicles destroyed and 21,500 Russian soldiers dead. Russia requires 4 years to replace these losses. Senior Russian army generals have been arrested, blamed
for seriously high battlefield deaths.
March 1944, Southern Ukraine
Lessons from the Eastern Front in 1944 whereby outnumbered Wehrmacht troops consistently outfought vast numbers of Red Army troops is worth examining. In defensive operations the enemy is delayed on approach, is halted on key terrain and on resuming his attack is annihilated. There are three phases of defensive operations: delaying action, positional defence and the counter-strike. The first and third of these three are mobile.
Battle Case Study: Northwest of Nokolajev, Southern Ukraine, March 1944.
March 1944 strong Soviet forces broke through weak German positions along the Ingul river. The 16 Panzer Grenadier Division and the 24 Panzer Division retreated to Nikolajev. The Soviet 23 Tank Corps, the 4 Guards Mechanised Corps, several rifle divisions advanced to Novy Bug, Nokolajev was threatened with encirclement. March 9 1944, 24 Panzer Division assembled c.6,000 men with 250 motor vehicles but there was no fuel, the troops exhausted. All infantry forces from 26 Panzer Division were placed under command of 26 Panzer Grenadier Regiment with scattered troops from 16 Panzer Grenadier Division formed into new company sized units. A series of delaying positions 9 – 17 March 1944 during one week succeeded in preventing the Soviets from advancing between the Ingulets river and Southern Bug ensuring the German bridgehead would allow the withdrawal of the Panzer Corps. Soviet Tank Corps and Rifle Corps consistently sent masses of tanks with hatches closed, forward, fully separating their Rifle Divisions and leaving tanks to be destroyed by German Panzer and German Panzer Grenadier attacks from the flanks - a counter-strike operation. Tanks were destroyed in large numbers, Rifle Divisions, lacking tank cover, were decimated The German Panzer and Panzer Grenadiers maintained their mobility throughout the battles of attrition on the Eastern Front.
Source: Counter-Strike Operations, Combat Examples and Leadership Principles of Mobile Defence, Die Wehrmacht im Kampf, F.M. von Senger und Etterlin, Casemate 2021